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NOTES AND COMMENTS
gress.18 Thus, this particular application of the statute seems invalid
as an exercise of either the police power or the taxing power.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SCOPE OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Respondents, a partnership, were engaged in furnishing meals
and beds to maintenance-of-way employees of a railroad. The meals
were served and beds were furnished in railway cars operated on the
railroad's tracks under a contract arrangement between respondents
and the railroad. The cars were located conveniently to the place
of the employees' work and in emergencies followed the gang to the
scene of its activities. The employees paid the respondents for these
services by authorizing the railroad company to deduct the amount due
from their wages and to pay it over to the respondents. The petitioner,
employed by respondents as a cook on one of its commissary cars and
performing all of his duties in the state of Texas, sought to recover
wages for overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act.., Held, the
petitioner was not "engaged in commerce" or in the "production of
goods for commerce" and thus does not come within the purview of the
act. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 63 Sup. Ct. 1248 (1943).
The constitutionality of a minimum wage and hour law and the
plenary power of Congress over all phases of interstate commerce have
been well established.2 The question involved, however, due to the
variance in the different statutes as to what constitutes commerce,3
is the determination of the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
This Act embraces all persons "engaged in commerce" or "engaged in
18. Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep't of Agriculture of California
et al., - U.S. - , 63 Sup. Ct. 628 (1943); Baltimore Nat'l
Bank v. Tax Comm., 297 U.S. 209 (1936); Owensboro Nat'l Bank
v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 (1899).
1. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. §201 et seq. (1938).
2. The power of Congress over interstate commerce " . is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (U.S. 1824);
see also N.L.R.B. v. Planter Mfg. Co., 105 F. (2d) 750 (C.C.A.
4th, 1939); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S.
453 (1938). For the first cases upholding the broad aspects of
the F.L.S.A. see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division of the Dep't of Labor, 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
3. In F.T.C. v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 35" (1941) the
Court said, "Translation of an implication drawn from the spe-
cial aspects of one statute to a totally different statute is treach-
erous business." See also Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517
(1941). Cf. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 448, 450, 29 U.S.
C.A. §152 (1935) ; Bituminous Coal Act, 50 Stat. 72, 83, 15 U.S.C.A.§828 (1937) ; Agriculture Adjustment Act, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C.A.




the production of goods for commerce. '" 4 However, since the petitioner
is not engaged in the production of any goods, as defined in the Act,5
he can prevail only if he can be held to be "engaged in commerce."
Unfortunately, recent decisions defining the scope and coverage
of the Fair Labor Standards Act have rendered lip service in favor
of strict construction, finding solace from the fact that the Act ap-
plied to the activities of the individual employee and not to the em-
ployer, and that the Act used the words "engaged in" rather than
"affecting" commerce.6 This heretofore talked-of construction finds
its first serious applicati6 n in the instant case which displays clearly
that it is unwarranted.7
4. Under Sec. 6 of the Act an employer must pay prescribed mini-
mum wages "to each of his employees who is engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce," and under
Sec. 7 overtime compensation must be given "any of his employees
who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce."
Commerce is defined as "trade, commerce, transportation,
transmission, or communication among the several States or from
any State to any place outside thereof." 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A.
§203 (b) (1938).
5. "Goods mean goods (including ships and marine equipment),
wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects
of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient there-
of. . . . " 52 Stat. 1061 (i), 29 U.S.C.A. §203(i) (1938).
6. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S.
517 (1941), edited the legislative history of the Act in favor of
strict construction, although he delivered a very liberal decision
in the development of the F.L.S.A. Walling v. Jacksonville Par
Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1942), while also holding the company wit
the Act, repeated the Kirschbaum dicta. Demonstrating the power
of such dicta the Court in Zehring et al. v. Brown Materials, Ltd.
et al., 48 F. Supp. 740, 744 (S.D. Calif. 1943) states dogmatically
that "it must be regarded as settled [citing the Kirschbaum case]
that the Act is not as broad in its regulation of commerce as the
National Labor Relations Board or the Interstate Commerce
Commission."
7. 83 Cong. Rec. 9175 (1938)., Senator Borah in defending the con-
stitutionality of the Act suggested the reason for the present
wording of the statute and for making the activities of the
employee the test. Furthermore, the entire debate on the floor
of the Senate displayed a fear of over-extension of the scope of
the Act and it was not as Mr. Justice Frankfurter would seem
to suggest when he said in Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517,
522 (1941) that "the history of the legislation leaves no doubt
that Congress chose not to enter areas which it might have
entered." For cases supporting a liberal construction of the
F.L.S.A. see Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co. et al., 113
F. (2d) 52 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940); Fleming v. Atlantic Co., 40
F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ga. 1941); see also Interpretative Bulletins
Nos. 1 and 5, Wage and Hour Manual, 27-34 (1941); Sutherland,
"Statutory Construction" (Horack's ed. 1943) §7207. "Laws
regulating wages and hours have received wide adoption and
while such laws constitute an interference with business, they
must be given a liberal interpretation to accomplish their long
range social objectives." Cooper, "The Coverage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act" (1939) 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 336.
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In the case at hand the court refused to follow the Smith decision
which had virtually identical facts,8 although there is direct authority
for using analogous cases construing the Federal Empkyers Liability
Act.0 The grounds for the refusal was the desire to evade the "over-
refinement" reached under that Act.10 But by this deci3ion the court
would seem to hold that although a cook for the maintenance-of-way
employees of a railroad," or a janitor and elevator operator of an
office building in which a considerable portion of the occupants are
engaged in commerce, 2 are not within the purview of the Fair Labor
Standards Act; yet a cook for a lumber company, 3 the nightwatchman,
fireman, or elevator operator for a loft building where the company
is engaged in the production of goods for commerce, 14 come within the
purview of the Act. There seems to be no logical reason for including
employees who are necessary to the production of goods for commerce
and excluding employees who are necessary for the instrumentalities
of commerce.
The tenor of Senate debate'0 and the preliminary declaration of
policy by Congress,' 0 alone, point conclusively toward a liberal con-
8. Philadelphia, B. & W. Ry. v. Smith, 250 U.S. 101 (1919). This
and the instant case have virtually identical facts with the
exception that in the principal case the petitioner was employed
by an independent contractor. This fact should be wholly im-
material. To hold otherwise would merely encourage companies
to use this device as a means of evading the Act. See Comment
(1942) 90 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 845.
9. Overstreet et al. v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131 (1943).
10. Instant case at 1250.
11. Instant case at 1248.
12. Cochran v. Florida National Building Corp., 45 F. Supp. 830
(S.D. Fla. 1942), aff'd, 134 F. (2d) 615 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943).
13. Houson v. Lagerstrom, 133 F. (2d) 120 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943);
Consolidated Timber Co. v. Womack, 132 F. (2d) 101 (C.C.A.
9th, 1942).
14. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1941).
15. 83 Cong. Rec. 9166 (1938). A greater part of the discussion
upon the floor of the Senate concerned the constitutionality of
the Act. The floor discussion showed a fear of over-extension
and not a desire to exercise only part of that power which Con-
gress possessed. Senator Bailey in reporting the bill from the
committee said, "I consider the bill manifestly ureonstitutional.
What justification is there for the view that the Supreme
Court will now uphold legislation of this type, when there is
case after case practically in every decade for the last 7 decades,
saying that the commerce clause does not extend to manufacture,
does not extend to mining, does not extend to agriculture? Yet
we proceed." In a joint Hearing before the Senate committee on
Education and Labor and the House Committee on Labor on S.
2475 and H.R. 2700, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 54, Assistant
Attorney General Jackson said, "The Act combines everything,
and is an effort to take advantage of whatever theories may pre-
vail on the court at the time the case is heard."
16. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. §202 (1938). Congressional finding and
declaration of policy: "(a) The Congress hereby finds that the
existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in production
of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the
19441
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struction of the statute. The immediate phrase, "engaged in com-
merce," has been held to include work which "is so intimately related
to interstate commerce 'as to be in practice and in legal contemplation
a part of it.' ",17 Notwithstanding the seemingly clear direction toward
a wholesome development of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the present
decision results in an unwarranted limitation on this development, and
if followed consistently will ultimately bring about the same incon-
gruous result as did similar decisions under the Federal Employers
Liability Act.' 8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CURFEW FOR CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt promulgated an ex-
ecutive order' conferring authority upon military commanders des-
ignated by the Secretary of War to effectuate a program for pro-
tection against espionage and sabotage to national-defense materials,
premises, and utilities.2 Pursuant to his authority under this order
the commander of the Western Defense Command3 issued various
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes
commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce...."
17. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 130 (1943).
Cf. Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942); 83 Cong.
Rec. 9169 (1938). Senator Bailey, even though he questioned
the constitutionality of the Act, went so far as to say, "I would
contend that the railroad organization is an instrumentality of
commerce between the States and relates to every man wherever
he may be and whatever he is doing, providing he is doing
something with regard to the system. The instrumentality idea
as applied to railroads takes in the whole system, not merely the
men who run the engine or the conductor who manages the car
or the brakeman, but the machinist in the shop who never leaves
the borders of the State."
18. Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry., 239 U.S. 556 (1916); Chicago &
N.W. Ry. v. Bolle, 284 U.S. 74 (1931); Chicago & E.I. Ry. v.
Industrial Comm. of Ill., 284 U.S. 296 (1932); New York, N.H.
& H. Ry. v. Bezue, 284 U.S. 415 (1932). Concerning the merits of
such cases see Gavit, "The Commerce Clause" (1932) 155. "The
truth is . . . that there was no real occasion for limiting the
application of the Employers' Liability Act as it has been lim-
ited; and the present interpretation can easily be said to be too
narrow." The Federal Employers Liability Act has since been
amended. 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C.A. §51 (1939).
1. Executive Order No. 9066, issued February 19, 1942. 7 Fed.
Reg. 1407.
2. The Order recited that "the successful prosecution of the war
requires every possible protection against espionage and sabotage
to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and na-
tional-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20,
1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940,
54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655."
3. The Secretary of War designated Lieutenant General J. L. De-
Witt as Military Commander of the Western Defense Command to
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